Home / Insights on entering the Indian market
2026.03.26
China and India are Asia's two economic giants, together accounting for about 36% of the world's population. In the food market as well, both boast enormous scale: China is about $1.7 trillion (2025) and India is about $354.5 billion (2024). However, the market structure, growth stage, and entry environment differ greatly between the two countries, and which market Japanese food companies should prioritize depends on each company's strategy.
This article compares the two countries across five axes: GDP, demographics, food market size, entry barriers, and regulatory environment, and derives strategic implications for Japanese food companies.
For basic information on the Indian market, please see the basic guide to doing business in India.
First, let's check the macroeconomic indicators of both countries. The main data as of 2025 is as follows.
| Metric | China | India | Ratio (China/India) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP (2025) | About $19.399 trillion | About $4.125 trillion | About 4.7x |
| GDP (PPP basis) | About $41.016 trillion | About $17.714 trillion | About 2.3x |
| GDP per capita (nominal) | $13,806 | $2,818 | About 4.9x |
| Population (2025) | 1.41 billion | 1.45 billion | 0.97x |
| Median population age | 39 years | 30 years | — |
| Consumer class population | 899 million | 473 million | About 1.9x |
| GDP growth rate (forecast) | About 4.5% | About 6.9% | — |
| Consumption as a share of GDP | 38% (PFCE) | 58% (PFCE) | — |
What the figures above clearly reveal is the difference in growth engines between India and China. China's ratio of personal consumption (PFCE) to GDP is 38%, well below the developed-country average (around 60%), whereas India's is 58%, reflecting a consumption-driven economic structure.
This is an extremely important point for food companies. In India, expanding consumption is a direct driver of GDP growth, so the growth rate of the food market tends to move in line with the GDP growth rate. In China, on the other hand, real estate investment and exports are the main growth drivers, and consumer market growth can sometimes fall below the GDP growth rate.
| Metric | China | India |
|---|---|---|
| Food processing market (actual) | About $232.1 billion | About $354.5 billion (2024, IBEF) |
| Food processing market (forecast) | — | About $535 billion (FY2026 forecast, IBEF) |
| Dining-out market | About $587.8 billion | About $65 billion |
| Online food delivery | Mature stage | About $12 billion (estimates vary by research firm, with annual growth rates of 11-28%) |
| Food's contribution to GDP | About 5% | About 1.9% |
| Food processing rate | Approx. 40% | About 10% |
| Asia-Pacific fast food share | 29.3% | 17.3% |
中国の食品加工率が約40%であるのに対し、インドは約10%にとどまっています。この数値のギャップこそが、インド食品市場の最大の投資テーマです。インド政府はPLI(生産連動型インセンティブ)スキームを通じて食品加工率の引き上げを国家戦略として推進しており、2030年までに食品加工市場を7,000億ドル規模に拡大する目標を掲げています。
For Japanese food companies, this "processing rate gap" means the following.
| Item | China | India |
|---|---|---|
| Foreign investment (FDI) regulation | Restricted by sector | Food processing has been 100% via the automatic approval route (since before 2016) |
| Joint venture requirement | Required in some sectors | Abolished |
| Food safety regulation | SAMR / State Administration for Market Regulation (strict) | FSSAI (complex but flexible) |
| Intellectual property protection | Improving but with challenges remaining | Legal framework in place |
| Language barrier | Chinese (single language) | 多言語(憲法指定22言語ほか) |
| Distribution infrastructure | Highly developed | Still developing (dominated by kirana stores) |
| Cold chain | Well established | Still developing (government surveys put post-harvest loss at around 5-15% depending on the item) |
| Digital infrastructure | The WeChat ecosystem | UPI, Zomato, Swiggy |
The biggest risk in the Chinese market is institutional risk (policy changes, tightened regulations, geopolitical tension), while the biggest risk in the Indian market is Infrastructure risk (underdeveloped distribution, logistics, and cold chain).
What matters for Japanese companies is which risk is more "controllable." Infrastructure risk can be resolved through investment and time, but institutional risk is an external factor that is difficult to manage through a company's own efforts. From this perspective, in the long run, India's risk profile is easier for Japanese companies to manage.
China's food safety regulations have become significantly stricter in recent years, and the following points in particular are hurdles for Japanese companies.
India's FSSAI (Food Safety and Standards Authority of India) is no less complex than China's, but has the following points of flexibility.
For details on food regulations, see the guide to India's regulatory environment. as well.
Based on the analysis so far, here is a framework for Japanese food companies to judge whether to prioritize "China" or "India."
In recent years, many Japanese companies have been pursuing a "China + 1" strategy to reduce their concentration in China. In the food sector as well, India is the leading candidate for "+1". The reasons are as follows.
For food companies, understanding consumer behavior patterns is fundamental to product strategy.
| Item | China | India |
|---|---|---|
| Consumer class size | 899 million | 473 million (projected to reach 773 million by 2030) |
| Median age | 39 years | 30 years |
| Urbanization rate | About 65% | About 36% |
| Share of spending on food | About 28% | Approx. 40% |
| E-commerce penetration rate | About 50% | About 15% (growing rapidly) |
| Vegetarian ratio | About 5% | About 30-40% |
| Health consciousness | High (rising demand for functional foods) | Rapidly rising |
India's vegetarian population is estimated at about 430 to 580 million people, which is a scale exceeding the entire population of the EU. This "vegetarian economy" is both a risk and a huge market opportunity for Japanese food manufacturers. Product development leveraging Japanese technology is possible in fields such as plant protein, vegetarian seasonings, and dairy alternative foods.
| Cost item | China | India |
|---|---|---|
| Factory land (monthly/sq m) | 30-80 yuan | 20〜50ルピー/sq ft(約215〜538ルピー/㎡) |
| Manufacturing average wage (monthly) | About 6,000-8,000 yuan | About 15,000-25,000 rupees |
| Corporate tax rate | 25% | 22%(実効約25.17%) |
| PLI and other subsidies | At the local government level | In place at the national level |
| Electricity cost | Relatively stable | Large regional variation |
One point to note on tax is the often-cited 15% corporate tax rate for new manufacturing businesses (Income Tax Act Section 115BAB). This was a time-limited measure available only to companies that began manufacturing by March 31, 2024, and as of August 2026 has neither been extended nor reinstated. It does not apply to Japanese food manufacturers now building a new plant, and in practice the applicable rate is the 22% under Section 115BAA (an effective rate of about 25.17% including surcharges and cess). Since this is not decisively different from China's standard rate of 25%, it is safer not to base an entry decision on tax rates alone.
In conclusion, the strategic choice for Japanese food companies can be summarized as follows.
If the goal is to maximize short-term sales -> China
China remains one of the world's largest food markets, with per-capita GDP nearly five times that of India. For companies that already have brand recognition, deepening their presence in the Chinese market is a rational choice.
If the goal is to capture long-term growth potential -> India
India is an "untapped market" with a food processing rate of only 10%, and it enjoys a triple tailwind of demographic dividend, FDI liberalization, and the PLI scheme. For companies that can invest with a 5- to 10-year long-term view, India's growth potential exceeds that of China.
The optimal solution is a "China + India" two-front strategy
For well-capitalized major food manufacturers, the optimal solution is a "two-front strategy" that maintains existing operations in China while gradually expanding investment in the Indian market. Delhi and Mumbai it is recommended to use this as a foothold to accelerate entry into the Indian market.
China's ratio of personal consumption to GDP is low, with investment and exports as the main growth drivers. India, by contrast, is consumption-driven, and expanding consumption directly drives GDP growth. As a result, in India the growth rate of the food market tends to track closely with the GDP growth rate.
India's food processing rate is far lower than China's, and this gap is the single biggest investment theme in India's food market. Because the processed food category itself remains immature, a category-creation strategy is effective. This contrasts with China's market, which is highly competitive and often leads to direct confrontation with major players.
China's biggest risk is institutional risk, such as policy changes, tightened regulations, and geopolitical tension, while India's biggest risk is infrastructure risk from underdeveloped distribution, logistics, and cold chain. Infrastructure risk can be resolved through investment and time, while institutional risk is difficult to manage through a company's own efforts, so India is considered easier to manage in the long run.
The reasons cited include its scale as the largest consumer market in Asia after China, its high GDP growth rate, its young population structure, FDI liberalization in the food sector, and stable Japan-India relations. These underpin India's advantage as a "+1" destination.
India's vegetarian population is enormous, representing both a risk and a huge market opportunity. Product development leveraging Japanese technology is said to be possible in fields such as plant protein, vegetarian seasonings, and dairy alternative foods.
If the goal is short-term sales, China, with its higher per-capita GDP and established brand recognition, is one option; if the goal is long-term growth potential, India, with its large untapped room for growth, is another. One solution for well-capitalized major companies is a two-front strategy that maintains existing operations in China while gradually expanding investment in India.
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